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RECENT DECISIONS
It is interesting to note that a foreign corporation doing business
in Ohio and having a managing agent who is served with summons is
subject to suit therein upon transitory actions arising outside of the
State.28 This enables the citizens of sister states, who have done
business in their own states with a foreign corporation which has since
stopped doing business and has withdrawn agents from those states,
to sue the corporation in the courts of Ohio, provided the corporation
has agents in Ohio, thus saving these citizens the expense and inconvenience of suing in some distant state where the company may be
incorporated. Residents of Ohio, who may have transacted business
with the foreign corporation outside of the State, are also protected
thereby.
Francis M. Marley.

RECENT DECISIONS
TAXATiON-BENEFIcAL AssocIATIoNs--NEBRASKA COURT HOLDS FREEMASONRY
RELiGious.-In the case of Ancient and Accepted Scottish Rite of Freemasonry
v. Board of County Com'rs., 241 N. W. 93 (1932), the Supreme Court of Nebraska held that one of the purposes of freemasonry is religious, within the meaning
of the constitutional and statutory provisions of that State exempting from taxation "all property owned and used exclusively for educational, religious or charitable purposes when such property is not owned or used for financial gain or
profit."
The property involved in the suit was the Scottish Rite Temple and grounds
in the city of Lincoln which had been entered upon the tax lists for the year
1926 at an assessed valuation of $110,000. The equitable title was in the Ancient
and Accepted Scottish Rite of Freemasonry and the legal title in the Scottish
Rite Building Company. The holder of the equitable title filed an application
with the Board of County Commissioners praying for an order striking this
property from the tax lists of 1929 on the ground that it was exempt from taxation under the provisions of the law above referred to. The Board dismissed the
application and complainant appealed to the district court which sustained the
Board's decision; and, upon appeal the supreme court reversed the judgment
of the district court.
In an elaborate opinion by Judge Eberly, the supreme court reviews the
adjudicated cases. Article VIII, Section 2, of the Nebraska Constitution is as
follows: "The Legislature by general law may exempt property owned by and
used exclusively for agricultural and horticultural societies, and property owned
and used exclusively for educational, religious, and charitable or cemetery pur.
poses, when such property is not owned or used for financial gain or profit to
either the owner or user." Under the foregoing constitutional provision, the
legislature provided: "The following property shall be exempt from taxes. ...
Property owned and used exclusively for educational, religious, charitable or
cemetery purposes, when such property is not owned or used for financial gain or
profit to either owner or user." Neb. Comp. Stat. (1929) § 77-202:
In discussing the religious aspect of the claim for exemption the court uses
the following language: "Masonry is traditionally and generally described as a
system of morality veiled in allegory and illuminated by symbols. It teaches as
28 Maichok v. Bertha-Consumers Co., op. cit. supra note 8.
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a foundation principle, faith in God and immortality of the soul. Masonry
is not sectarian in its religious teaching. It aims to bring its devotees a deeper
and more conscious contact with spiritual things. To the extent that religious
purposes include the field of morals, Masonry makes common cause with organized religion. Masonry is tolerant of all faiths and builds a moral and spiritual
fellowship on the foundations of lundamental morality common to them. It
brings its members to the altar of prayer and by its very teaching and effort,
seeks to make real the invisible power of love, the intrinsic worth of harmony,
and the beauty and eternal reality of the ideal. Outside of the activity of
Masonry which is devoted to charity, which constitutes a very substantial and
major part of its endeavors, all of its activities in all of its bodies are devoted
to those purposes which properly fall within definition of 'educational' and 'religious.' The positive testimony based upon the positive knowledge of the
witnesses testifying in summarizing is that, measured by its purpose as exemplified by appellant, and as applied in its work as a lodge or society (to
quote from the record before us), 'Masonry falls entirely, without exception,
within the three categories of charity, educational purpose and religious purpose.
It has no other function or purpose and does no other work.' Further that the
statements thus made 'may be fully verified in every particular by reference to
a large body of masonic literature available to anyone who is interested in studying it, open to everybody representing the best masonic thought for centuries
back in time.'"
It is curious to note that, in 1921, this same court held the same property
used exclusively for the same purposes, and under essentially the same claim, not
to be exempt. So, in rendering the decision under consideration, the court was
compelled to and did overrule its own previous decisions in Appeal of Scbttish
Rite Building Co., 106 Neb. 95, 182 N. W. 574, 17 A. L. R. 1020, (1921), and
Mt. Moriah Lodge, No. 57 A. F. and A. M., Syracuse, Neb., v. Otoe County,
101 Neb. 274, 162 N. W. 639 (1917), in so far as they conflicted, and they are
in direct conflict on the decisive point in the case. It is believed that this is
the only case in which a court of last resort has held freemasonry to be religious.
William M. Cain.
University of Notre Dame, College of Law.

WILLs-CoNsTRucTIoN-IDENTIcATIoN

Op BENEFICmARY-TETAmZNTARY

IN-

TENT-ASCERTAN.MENT FRom WILL AONE.--The appellants are the sister and the
several nephews and nieces of the deceased. The respondents are seven orphan
asylums of the city and county of San Francisco. The appeal is from a decree of
final distribution which distributed the estate in equal shares to the seven respondents. The portion of the decree appealed from was reversed. The olographic will
of the deceased, duly admitted to probate, read as follows:
"When I am dead I wont everyting to go to Offens home of
San-Francisco. You find everything in box 3608 Humbolt Bank.
This is my last Will.
"March 20, 1927

Edward J. A. Zilke."
It was stipulated upon the hearing of the petition for distribution that appellants
are the heirs at law and next of kin of the deceased and that the seven orphan
asylums are situated in the city and county of San Francisco. No further evidence on the subject was offered. The parties assumed in the briefs that there
was no institution, association or corporation bearing the name "Offens home of
San-Francisco" or "Orphan's Home of San Francisco." And it is further assumed
that the seven respondents conduct all the orphan's homes in San Francisco.
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Neither assumption is supported by evidence in the record. Held, that the gift
failed because of the indefiniteness in description of the beneficiary. In re Zilke's
Estate, 1 Pac. (2d) 475 (1931).
The court argued that if there was no institution bearing the name of the
beneficiary used in the will, and, as there were seven institutions in San Francisco
conducted as orphan's homes, a latent ambiguity arose which might have been
removed by parol evidence; that since no evidence was offered to remove the
ambiguity, the court was compelled to ascertain the intention of the testator
from the face of the will alone. Looking at the face of the will, the court
said that since the testator had capitalized the word "Offens" it indicated that
he intended to describe a particular institution, especially since the word "home"
was in the singular, so the language used was insufficient to support a decree in
favor of all the orphan's homes in San Francisco.
The court's argument is open to criticism. First, it would seem that no particular stress could be laid upon the fact that the word "Offens" was capitalized
since the word "home" was not capitalized and that would be a part of the
designation of a particular beneficiary. Furthermore, the word "Will" was capitalized which would go to show the testator laid no particular emphasis upon
the capitalization of "Offens." Second, it seems that the testator's ultimate
intention was to benefit the orphans of San Francisco; but the immediate
intention is not to make a direct gift to them. Sufficient appears from the face
of the will to show this, and it is a general rule that the courts will uphold the
will and carry out the testator's intent if it can reasonably do so without doing
violence to the Statute of Wills, ut res magis valeat quam pereat.
The manner in which the will was written and executed does not permit
of too much emphasis upon clerical errors.
The word "you" might be of advantage in limiting the bequest to a particular institution, but a more reasonable conclusion would be that it referred to the
testator's personal representative, and the sentence begining with this word was
probably intended as merely an administrative aid in the settlement of the estate.
It appears that the testator intended a direct gift to the legatee or legatees
named in will rather than a gift in trust for the benefit of the orphans of San
Francisco.
With the aid of intrinsic evidence it might appear that a particular orphan's
home was meant. But without the aid of this testimony the solution will not
be aided by striking out any of the words used describing the beneficiary. If
we struck out the word "home" there would not be enough left on the face of
the will to indicate with a reasonable degree of certainty what legatee or legatees
were in the mind of the testator. And the courts have consistently refused to insert
words in a will. In In re Goods of Bushell [1887] 13 P. D. 7 the court substituted
the word "Bristol" for "British" in a gift to the "British Royal Infirmary." But
this case was disapproved in In the Goods of Louis Schott [1901] P. D. 190,
where the court refused to allow the order of substitution made in In re Goods
of Bushell to be carried into practice. This is a much stronger case than the
principal case because, first, the will was not read over to the testator, and second,
affidavits showed the real intention of the testator.
The writing failing as a will, is it possible to work it into something of value
and effect by construing it a trust? The same has been suggested on the strength
of Hunt v. Fowler, 121 Ill.
269, 12 N. E. 331 (1887). 27 Ill.
Law Rev. 98, 99
(1932). A will in this case contained the following residuary clause: "All the
rest and residue of my estate including that which may lapse for any cause, I
direct to be invested or loaned upon the best terms possible, so as to produce
the largest income, and said income to be distributed among the worthy poor
of the city of La Salle, in such manner as a court of chancery may direct." The
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heirs at law brought suit to have testatrix declared intestate in respect to that
part of the estate contained in the residuary clause, and that they, the heirs at
law, be declared owners of such estate on the ground that there is no agency
of any sort for the distribution of charity to the poor of the city of La Salle;
that its authorities have no such duty, and that the codicil containing this
residuary clause is incapable of execution because of the uncertainty of the beneficiaries intended by the testatrix and is therefore void. Held: "It is an
essential feature of public or charitable trusts that the beneficiaries are uncertain,
'--a class of persons described in some general language, often fluctuating, changing in their individual numbers, and partaking of a quasi public character." The
class here is definite but the individuals of the class to whom the bounty is to
be distributed are uncertain. The fact that a trustee is not made certain will
not be fatal to a charitable trust, for a court of equity will carry the trust
into effect either by appointing a trustee, or by itself acting in place of a trustee.
Such is true where the class of beneficiaries is sufficiently definite. "But if a
testator makes a vague and indefinite bequest to charity, and names no trustee,
and gives no power to the court to appoint, there is no power in the American
courts to administer such an incohate and imperfect gift." Perry on Trusts and
Trustees, § 731. But the charity here is specific and will entail no great difficulty
in execution. Distribution within the power of the chancery court has been requested and such administration will fulfill the donor's intention, and it was so
decreed.
Any effort to apply the principles of the Fowler case to In re Zilke's Estate
is frustrated by Zilke's will itself. First of all, no intention to create a trust,
charitable or otherwise, appears. Next., there is a failure of designation to a
particular class, wherein is the essential, distinguishing feature from the Fowler
case. So obscure is Zilke's meaning that we cannot say whether he wished
to benefit a single orphan's home or all the orphan's homes, and, as before
stated, the presence of the word "home" removes the orphans themselves from
the sphere of direct recipients of the testators bounty. Finally, Zilke has failed
to designate a trustee or leave the power of distribution to the discretion of the
court. While this omission of itself, according to the Fowler case, is not fatal
if the court finds its power sufficient to carry out the bequest, yet, when it is
coupled with a failure to sufficiently designate a class of beneficiaries, it is not
within the power of the American courts, as Mr. Perry states, "to administer
such an incohate and imperfect gift."
E. L. Barrett.

CONTRACTS-CONSIDERATION-THE RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACT LAw.-The case
of W. B. Saunders Co. v. Gaibraith, 178 N. E. 34 (Ohio 1931), provides a very
interesting point for discussion. It contains an application of the principles of
the Restatement of the Law of Contracts, now being prepared by the American
Law Institute. The facts of the case are not important in regard to this discussion and they therefore will not be considered. The principle under discussion
is that contained in Section 90 of the Restatement. However, it is the remarks
which accompany the statement which make this case outstanding.
This opinion is written by Judge Mauck. He says: "By following the admirable notes of Professor Ferson it would not be difficult to sustain the soundness of Section 90 as the boiled-down essence of the law of Ohio. We are content,
however, to take the Restatement as the law of this state without exploring its
soundness, and hold that of its own vigor it is adequate authority. This is not
to say that the Restatement is of necessity perfect, and that in it is to be found
the law's last word. We only hold that he who would not have it followed has
the burden of demonstrating its unsoundness."
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This is certainly an astounding statement. The first sentence of the quotation
seems entirely logical, and if true, open to no criticism. If Section 90 contains
the boiled-down essence of the law of Ohio, then certainly it is authority in
Ohio, not because it is the Restatement, but because it conforms to the existing
law there. But when the learned judge proceeds to go further, and to say that
the Restatement is law in Ohio because it is the Restatement, and not because it
conforms to the already existing law there, the statement seems to be open to
almost unlimited criticism. Of course, he, in all probability, means that the
Restatement is prima facie the law, and if the law is in fact different, the opposing party may introduce proof to show this, but even this seems to go beyond
the province of a judge, in that it makes the Restatement the standard to which
the existing law must be shown to conform or not to conform, instead of making
the existing law the standard to which the Restatement must be shown to conform
or not to conform.
This certainly is contrary to the expressed intention of the American Law
Institute. In their official booklet "The American Law Institute, A Short Summary of Pertinent Facts," p. 3, they say: "The purpose of the Restatement is to
make a clear and accurate statement of the fundamental principles of the common
law. The hope is that the work will be so well done that inherent excellence and
the personnel of the Institute will enable the Restatement to command the respect
and attention of the courts. It is not desired that the Restatement shall be
adopted by the legislatures as a code. The Institute has been founded to preserve
the common law system of developing law through the judicial determination of
actual cases ....
The Institute is created to preserve the common law system, not
to destroy it." And is it any less destructive of the common law system to have
the Restatement adopted as law itself by the courts, than to have it adopted as a
code by the legislatures? Certainly this is more than the respect and the attention
of the courts, which is all that the framers of the Restatement desired.
This assumption of the Restatement as law is also contrary to the general'
trend of the authorities in the country. From the examination of twenty-five
citations of cases in which the Restatement is referred to as authority, which
practically exhaust these citations down to the present time, we find that it
is quoted with varying effect. Two of these citations come from the Federal courts,
and the rest from ten supreme courts of various states. In order to get a true
perspective on the real weight given the Restatement in these courts, the references
may be classified. In eleven of these twenty-five cases, the Restatement was
merely referred to, in support of other authorities. In ten of the twenty-five, it
was quoted in support of other authorities, which were quoted before it. In one
of these twenty-five, it was quoted in support of the judge's position, and then
other references were brought in as supplementary authority. In three of the
twenty-five, it was the only authority quoted in support of a point which the
judge made. And in one of the twenty-five, it was quoted and the judge took
exception to it, holding that it was contrary to the law of that state, in this
particular matter, These of course, do not include the principal case under discussion. The stand that this learned judge takes is unique.
The Restatement has been quoted by nineteen judges in these twenty-five citations. Some of these are outstanding for their learning and authority. Chief of
these is Judge Benjamin Cardozo; but it might be noted that all of his references
fall into the first division of the classification given above.
From this we see that the Restatement of Contract Law is exercising a great
deal of influence on the courts, and is being accepted by them as an authority.
It is however, the authority of a text-book which is being, and which should be
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accorded to it. It gains its eminence from the learning of its authors, and its
propositions deserve a consideration which is commensurate to those authors;
but to step from quoting it as a text, and in support of the judge's interpretation of the existing law to the acceptance of it as the law itself appears to
demand more authority than the weight of one isolated decision affords, and to
give to the Restatement more authority than even the eminence of its authors
can justly expect.
John M. Crimmins.

LIaEL AND

SLANDER-PRIVILEGED

PUBLICATIONS-TRUTH-MALICE

OF AGENT

IMPUTED TO PRINCIPAL-CHAROES OF ARREST.-The plaintiff, Thompson, brought
three suits for libel against the Globe Publishing Company, the Boston Publishing
Company, and the Boston Transcript Company, which were tried together. The
alleged libels, contained in the newspapers published by these companies, were
in substance that the plaintiff had been arrested on a warrant charging him with
being a fugitive from justice, and that he was wanted in Concord, New Hampshire, to answer a charge of larceny in connection with inducing one Callahan
to steal eight printed pages of the May, 1927, issue of the Atlantic Monthly.
The answers set up truth and privilege, and the main question in each case
arises on the correctness of the rulings by the trial judge as to what evidence, as
a matter of law, justified these defenses, and as to the correctness of the plaintiff's requests for rulings. Thompson v. Globe Publishing Company, 181 N. E.
249 (Mass. 1932). A few of these rulings and requests will be considered seriatim.
1. That the proceeding before the judge of the district court that issued the
warrant was a judicial proceeding, within the privilege rule. Held, the privilege
rule extends to the application for the issuance of warrants. The general rule is
that a fair report in a newspaper of a pending judicial proceeding is privileged;
and the privilege extends to all matters that have been made the subject of
judicial action, though such proceedings may be merely preliminary or interlocutory, Kimball v. Post Publishing Co., 199 Mass. 248, 85 N. E. 103, 19 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 862, 127 Am. St. Rep. 492 (1908), Kimber v. Press Assa. [18931 1 Q. B.
65, 62 L. J. Q. B. N. S. 152, or ex parte, Conner v. Standard Pub. Co., 183
Mass. 474, 67 N. E. 596 (1903), Meriwether v. Publishers: George Knapp & Co.,
211 Mo. 199, 109 S. W. 750, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 953 (1908). But this privilege
is limited to matters that have been made the subject of judicial action. It does
not extend to publication of matters contained in declarations or other papers
filed in court, where no judicial action has been taken. Chapin on Torts, 329;
Cowley v. Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392, 50 Am. Rep. 318 (1884).
2. The plaintiff requested a ruling that the plea of truth could not be
established until the jury had been satisfied that a theft had actually been committed. Held, that the publication of the fact that an arrest had been made,
and upon what accusation it had been made, is not actionable, if true. "The defense against an action for writing of one that he has been arrested upon a
particular charge is that the fact is true. But if to this fact there is added by
way of comment words which amount to an accusation that the charge is true,
or comment which assumes the guilt of the person arrested, by headlines or otherwise, the mere fact that the person was arrested upon the charge stated is no
justification for words imputing guilt." Lurton, J., in Commercial Publishing
Company v. Smith, 149 Fed. 704 (1907).
3. The trial court ruled that the plaintiff was entitled to submit evidence
of publications of the defendants, subsequent to those set out in the declarations,
to show express malice. Upon exceptions taken by the defendants it was held,
that the jury is entitled to consider subsequent publications in determining
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whether or not, because they were subsequently published, the defendants were
actuated by actual malice. "Evidence of other or similar slanderous words, spoken
at other times and places, is admissible to show that the words charged in the
complaint were spoken with malice and ill-will! So if repetitions of the slander
charged of the defendant whether before 'or after the occasion sued for, or before
or after the suit was commenced." Thockmorton's Cooley on Torts, 352, 3S3.
4. The plaintiff sought to show express malice on the part of two of the
newspaper companies involved by showing such malice on the part of the persons
employed in editorial and reportial capacity by these companies. Held, that the
actual malice which is imputable from an agent to his principal in such cases
is restricted to those agents who are entrusted with the responsibility of determining what should and what should not be published. Accord: Friedell v. Blakely
Printing Company, 163 Minn. 226, 203 N. W. 974 (1925).
Philip L. Konop.
NEGOTABLE INSTRUMENTS-REFRMATION Or INSTRUMENTs.-The recent case
of Renihan v. Piowaty, 179 N. E. 568 (Ind. 1932), deals with the reformation
of a negotiable promissory note to conform to the true intent of the maker and
the payee. It is a case which challenges the attention of one who has just completed a course in Negotiable Instruments and at first glance the decision startles
such a student. The subject itself is governed by such definite rules, and
embodied in such formalism, that to the average student a negotiable note
takes the form of a very sacred instrument. To him its negotiability confers on
the instrument a solemnity not possessed by a deed or a judgment. He gathers
the idea that it is immutable, a veritable deus ex machina ruling with an iron
hand all it touches. He has been so immersed in rules of interpretation, and so
governed by rules of construction that the possibility of getting at the true intent -and meaning of the parties by altering the subject matter and thus bringing
a new set of rules into play takes on the aspect of heresy to him. At least so
it was with me. And it needs just such a case as this to bring him back to a
true sense of perspective, and to make him realize that law, and even the law of
negotiable instruments, is primarily a matter of rational justice and not of formalistic reasoning; that the rules are only means toward arriving at the truth and
not the truth itself.
The facts of the case are briefly these. The defendant, Ernest Piowaty, was
a resident of South Bend, Indiana. He had a brother, Fred Piowaty, in Grand
Rapids, Michigan, who was general manager of M. Piowaty & Sons, a corporation engaged in the wholesale fruit business, in which the defendant was in no
way interested. Fred became ill and Ernest went to Grand Rapids to assume
control of the corporation during his brother's illness. During this period, two
notes held by the banker, of whose estate the plaintiff is administrator, fell due,
and the defendant renewed them for the corporation, signing them "M. Piowaty
& Sons, Ernest Piowaty." The cashier of the bank, with whom defendant dealt
through an intermediary, contented himself with the knowledge that Fred had
power -to bind the corporation, and did not enquire into the defendant's personal financial responsibility. When these notes fell due, Fred had died and
Ernest had returned to South Bend. The corporation was in financial difficulties
and went into the hands of receivers. The bank, having no security, was unable
to collect the notes. Five years later they sued this defendant on these notes.
The defendant, in his answer to plaintiff's complaint, filed a general denial
with an affirmative paragraph as a defense. To this a demurrer was sustained.
Then defendant introduced a third paragraph, claiming .that at the time of the
execution of the notes that there was an understanding between the parties
that Ernest Piowaty was signing in a purely representative capacity, and asking
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that the instrument be reformed to conform to the true intent of the parties by
placing the word "by" after the words "M. Piowaty & Sons," and the words
"acting manager" after the signature of Ernest. The plaintiff's demurrer to this
paragraph was overruled. Judgment was given for the defendant, and the plaintiff appealed on the grounds that this demurrer was wrongfully overruled and
that the evidence did not sustain the judgment.
The proof substantiated the facts as given, and they were not disputed. The
principal point in the contention was the disagreement as to the understanding
between the parties at the time of the execution of t*e instruments. Counsel for
the plaintiff argued that there was no mutuality of mistake, that. the defendant
only was in error, and that thus there was no ground for equity intervention.
Also he further argued that if there was a mistake, it wqs a mistake of law and
equity will not step in to correct a mistake of law. Counsel for the defendant
ably answered these propositions. In regard to the first, he placed the plaintiff on
the horns of a dilemma by saying that either both parties were mistaken in the
transaction, or that the defendant was mistaken and the plaintiff was knowingly
attempting to take an unfair advantage of his mistake at the time mistake was
committed, which amounts to fraud; and in either of these possibilities equity will
interfere in the interests of natural and substantial justice. In regard to the second
point made by the plaintiff, defendant answers that it is settled law that "even
though there is a misapprehension of the law intermixed with a mistake of fact,
which defeated the mutual intent of the parties, the remedy by reformation is
still available. The courts long ago departed from the ancient rule that only
mistakes purely of fact could be corrected in equity."
Thus a mistake was established by the reasoning of the counsel for the defendant. On this mistake, from the acts of the parties, the law construes a contract such as the parties really intended. In this case, the parties really intended
that Ernest Piowaty should sign in a representative capacity only. Therefore
the court, in accordance with good reasoning, and according to defendant's
prayer, ordered that. the instrument be reformed by placing the word "by" after
"M. Piowaty & Sons" and the words "acting manager" after the signature "Ernest
Piowaty."
It is a matter for speculation as to whether this result could have been attained without resorting to equity. It seems that before the Negotiable Instruments Law was passed that the fact. of the actual agency would have been a
good defense to the suit, even though the defendant apparently signed as a
principal. We have three leading cases to support this view. The first of these
is Mechanics Bank of Alexander v. Bank of Columbia, 5 Wheat 326, 5 L. Ed.
100 (1820), which holds that "it is enough for the purposes of the defendant to
establish that there existed on the face of the paper circumstances from which
it might reasonably be inferred that it was either one or the other (signature of
agent as agent or as principal). In that case it became indispensible to resort to
extrinsic evidence to remove the doubt." And later "It is by no means true, as
was contended in argument, that the acts of agents derive their validity from
professing, on the face of them, to have been done in the exercise of their
agency." The second authority is that of Second Nat. Bank -. Midland Steel
Co., 155 Ind. 581 (1900), which holds that "Rules of form in certain cases,
have been prescribed by law, and where that is so, those rules in general
must be followed, but in the diversified duties of general agent, the liability
of the principal depends upon the fact that the act was done within the
limits of the powers delegated, and those powers are necessarily inquirable into
by the court and jury." And finally the case of Ford v. William, 21 How. 289,
16 L. Ed. 36, (1858), holds that "The contract of the agent is the contract of
the principal, and he may sue or be sued thereon though not named therein.
Parol proof may be admitted to show the real nature of the transaction, and it is

